Building on the framework introduced by Baron (1994) and used extensively by others, we model the case where there are two types of voters: informed and uninformed. In the absence of political advertising, the uninformed voters do not know the relative positions of the candidates. We investigate two opposing assumptions regarding candidate preferences: (1) both candidates maximize the probability of winning; and (2) both candidates maximize expected policy implementation. We consider a "worst-casescenario." A pressure group has a monopoly on campaign funds and can make the following binding take-it-or-leave-it offer to one or both candidates: in exchange for the candidate taking a particular position, the pressure group will provide money for political advertising. Despite the extreme power of the pressure group, we show that pressure group contributions to political campaigns moves the outcome toward the most preferred position of the median voter.
There is an extremely large literature, which assumes that uninformed voters are simple automatons -the more money a candidate spends on advertising, the more votes the candidate receives. 1 The main conclusion of this literature is that, on average, pressure group donations make the outcome worse for the median voter -a conclusion opposite of that derived here. In our literature review, we will ignore work that assumes welfare is made worse by the existence of the pressure group; 4 here, advertising always improves the welfare of the median voter. The reason for these differing results appears to be due to the nature of the information provided. Information on relative quality helps the high-quality candidate; while information on relative position only helps the candidate closer to the median voter.
The aforementioned papers all assume that the candidates are only interested in winning. Coate (2001 Coate ( , 2002 assumes that political parties represent perfectly opposing ideological preferences (this need not be the case in our model). In his first paper, each party's candidate is either ideological (taking an extreme position) or pragmatic (taking a position closer to the median). The positions of the ideological and pragmatic candidates are exogenous and known by the voters (unlike out model), but the voters do not know whether the candidate is ideological or not. In his model, pressure groups endorse the party's pragmatic candidate, thereby moving the outcome towards the median voter. In Coate's second paper, the candidates differ in quality, which is unknown to the voters. He assumes that advertisements are truthful (in this paper, truth is shown to be an equilibrium strategy) and that the uninformed are rational predictors (in this paper, we show how the uninformed can use simple rules of thumb to generate optimal voting behavior). He also assumes that the positions of the candidates are exogenous but that favors to the pressure groups (in return for contributions) are endogenous. So again the analysis is quite different from that considered here. 5 And again the results differ for much the same reasons that the Prat results differ. In his model, the pressure group extorts all the welfare gains from the added information. This is possible when the inside 4 The reasoning is as follows: The median voters prefer the high-quality candidate who yields Q more utility in quality and Q -ε less utility in position over the low-quality candidate at the median voter's most preferred position. But the median voter prefers to have no advertising and both candidates at the median voter's most preferred position with the high-quality candidate winning half the time. 5 Still further afield is the work by Ortuno-Ortin and Schultz (2001) . They like Coate (2002) , assume that the candidates have ideological preferences and that voters have rational expectations without showing how these expectations might be formed in practice. They do not consider the role of pressure groups. Instead they discuss public funding of information.
information is about quality, but it is not the case when the inside information is about position. Austen-Smith (1987) assumes that political advertising is used to reduce the ambiguity about a candidate's position. In his model risk-averse voters are willing to vote for a candidate with an inferior expected position if the variance (ambiguity about the platform) is smaller. In turn, a pressure group is willing to fund such advertising if the candidate moves closer to the preferred position of the pressure group. Here, we show that knowledge of one candidate's position allows the uninformed voters to make intelligent inferences about the other candidate's position. Thus reducing ambiguity cannot result in a move away from the median uninformed voter's preferred position, as is the case in Austen-Smith's model.
We next consider the model in greater detail.
ASSUMPTIONS
(a) Let X be a one-dimensional issue space composed of N integer positions [1, 2, ... N].
x is an element of X.
(b) There are two candidates, 1 and 2, who choose positions x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Let P 1 be the probability that candidate 1 wins the election and P 2 be the probability that candidate 2 wins the election (P 1 + P 2 = 1). Both candidates have one of the following 2 objectives functions:
(i) Each maximizes her probability of being elected. That is, candidate i maximizes P i . If a candidate has a zero probability of being elected, then the candidate will maximize vote share (if the loser does not demonstrate a credible showing, the political party in the next election may replace the candidate with someone who the party thinks will know the distribution of voter preferences better).
(ii) Candidates value policy implementation. Let V i (x j ) be candidate i's utility if candidate j wins the election and implements policy x j (i, j = 1 or 2). V i (x j ) is strictly concave and symmetric with a maximum at € ˆ v i . Candidate i maximizes expected utility from implemented policy --P 1 V i (x 1 ) + P 2 V i (x 2 ). If a candidate's position has no effect on the outcome of the election, then the candidate prefers more voters to fewer. 6 (c) Each voter i has a symmetric strictly-concave utility function, U i (x), with a maximum at x = ˆ x i , i's most preferred position. There are n informed voters (i = 1, ... n) with a median most preferred position at integer ˆ x m I , and m uninformed voters (i = n + 1, ... n + m) with a median most preferred position at integer ˆ x m U . n is odd and m is even (which means that there are an even number of uninformed voters with a most preferred position at ˆ x m U ). There is at least one informed voter at every possible position. (d) Let y c be the amount of money donated by the pressure group to candidate c for political advertising. When the pressure group has donated money to only one candidate, we will at times refer to the candidate as the "endorsed" candidate. U p (x) -y 1 -y 2 is the pressure group's utility function when x is the winning position. U p (x) is a symmetric and strictly concave with a maximum at x = ˆ x p , the pressure group's most preferred position.
The pressure group knows the objective of the candidates. To avoid wasting time on useless details we will also make the following two assumptions. (i) It is costly for the pressure group to make offers and it is more costly for the pressure group to donate to 2 candidates than to donate to 1 candidate; and (ii) if pressure group donations move the outcome closer to the pressure group's preferred position, then the benefit of doing so outweighs the cost. Finally, we assume that if the outcome is the same, the pressure group prefers endorsing the winning candidate over endorsing the losing candidate.
(e) Uninformed voters do not observe x 1 , x 2 , or y c . They do not observe the agreement (if there is one) between the pressure group and a candidate, nor do they know whether a candidate has rejected an offer or an offer has not been made in the first place. The uninformed do know their own ˆ x i , whether their most preferred position is to the left, to the right or at the overall median ( weakly to the right of ˆ x m I . Through advertising they know which candidates have been endorsed.
Campaign contributors are often identified. In the United States such information is required by law. Furthermore, the candidate receiving funds often advertises that she has received support from various interest groups and sometimes the other candidate claims that the first candidate has been bought out by special interests. 7 Certainly, it is no secret when the National Rifle Association supports one of the candidates in an election and it is no secret where the NRA stands on gun control. Hence, our assumption that uninformed voters know the relative position of ˆ x p seems justified.
Preference polls on issues are often reported in the papers and on television. So, it is not unreasonable to assume that the uninformed know the policy preference of the median voter. 8 Knowledge of the median informed voter's most preferred position might be obtained by observing early poll data, where the uninformed are least likely to report an opinion. If the reader is uncomfortable with this latter assumption, one can substitute the following alternative assumption: advertising reveals which candidate is to the right of the other. For example, knowing that one candidate is supported by the National Rifle Association tells otherwise uninformed voters that the other candidate is more supportive of gun control. See the discussion following the proof for an explanation why this alternative assumption can be substituted for the assumptions regarding knowledge of the relative position of ˆ x m I without changing the results.
7 For a discussion of the importance of pressure group endorsements, see Lupia (1994) . Here, an endorsement is a signal from the pressure group. Banks (1990) has a different kind of signaling model where it is costly for candidates to move from their true position. His model does not deal with the kind of issues we are considering here 8 When I refer to the median voter, this means the median voter over all voters, informed and uninformed. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) show that the uninformed can learn a lot from poll data. In contrast to the work here, their article does not deal with pressure groups. Also, in contrast to the present paper, in their article voters make no inferences based on the objectives of the candidates. See also Cukierman (1991) and Grofman and Norrander (1991) .
The game proceeds as follows:
(1) Nature chooses the distribution of informed voters' preferences, the distribution of uninformed voters' preferences, the pressure group's most preferred position, and then the preferences of the candidates, which are drawn from a symmetric distribution around x m I . 9
(2) The pressure group makes a one-time take-it-or-leave-it offer to one or both of the candidates. If candidate C agrees to choose position x*, then the pressure group will provide y c to the candidate for political advertising. If the agreement is accepted, it is binding on both sides. This is a simplified version of a menu auction. Allowing the pressure group to make one-time offers to the candidates instead of vice-versa and without the possibility of the candidates making counter offers increases the power of the pressure group. If the pressure group has the same information as the candidates, then the candidates cannot take advantage of any inside information and the menu auction reduces to the take-it-orleave-it offer considered here. With only one pressure group, instead of two or more, the power of the pressure group is maximized. These and other implicit assumptions create a worst-case scenario. If we can show that pressure group donations are welfare improving when the pressure group has all this power, then we have a very strong result, indeed.
(3) Each candidate knows the objective of the other candidate and whether the other side has received an offer and the value of x*. They simultaneously decide whether to accept the offer (if one has been made) or choose another position. If no candidate accepts the offer, then the pressure group is out of the picture.
(4) The positions of the candidates are then made public to the informed voters. The candidate who received the donation then advertises.
(5) The voters choose. 9 We make such an assumption so that the uninformed voters cannot make useful inferences about the candidates' preferences and positions. If they could, they might no longer be uninformed. The uninformed voters first observe whether there has been advertising and absorb its content, if any. Each uninformed voter then either votes or abstains.
(6) The candidate receiving the most votes wins the election and implements x c . The voters then receive utility U i (x c ).
We next consider a simple strategy by the uninformed and a possible counter strategy by the informed.
DEFINITION:
The uninformed voters have a strategic rule of thumb if the following holds:
When neither candidate has been endorsed or both candidates have been endorsed, then the uninformed voters vote for each candidate with probability 1/2 or abstain. Otherwise, the uninformed voter votes for the unendorsed candidate.
DEFINITION: The informed voters have a counter strategy if the following holds:
An indifferent informed voter will vote for each candidate with probability onehalf unless one and only one candidate has been endorsed and the candidates have identical positions. Under these circumstances the informed voter will vote for the endorsed candidate if the outcome of the election is strictly better for the informed voter than the outcome in the absence of an endorsement the informed voter will vote for the other candidate if the outcome of the election is strictly worse for the informed voter than the outcome in the absence of an endorsement the informed voter will vote for each candidate with probability one-half if the outcome of the election would be the same in the absence of an endorsement.
This counter-strategy is plausible. Those informed voters who are hurt by endorsements would try to discourage endorsements by voting against the endorsed candidate, if the candidates were otherwise identical; while those informed voters who benefit from the existence of endorsements would try to encourage endorsements by voting for the endorsed candidate, if they the candidates were otherwise the same. This counter-strategy assumption is actually not necessary to obtain our basic results. But if we instead assume that indifferent informed voters vote for each candidate with probability 1/2, then the candidates will engage in mixed strategies, which involves a more complicated analysis. This mixed-strategy equilibrium gives similar but not identical results to the pure-strategy equilibrium that is obtained when indifferent informed voters engage in the counter strategy. Furthermore as the number of informed voters increases this mixed-strategy equilibrium approaches the pure-strategy equilibrium that results under the counter-strategy behavior.
PROPOSITIONS
The following two propositions, which give no role to pressure groups, will serve as benchmarks for comparison. Because the results are well known, they will be presented without proof.
PROPOSITION A: Suppose that there are no pressure groups. If candidates maximize the probability of winning (assumption B.i), then both candidates will be at the median of the informed voters, ˆ x m I .
PROPOSITION B:
Suppose that there are no pressure groups and that the candidates maximize their expected utility from policy implementation (assumption B.ii). If the candidates' most preferred positions are on opposite sides of the median informed voter, then both candidates will be at ˆ x m I . If the candidates' most preferred positions are on the same side of ˆ x m I , then both candidates will be at the most preferred position of the candidate whose preferences are closest to the median informed voter.
The proof of Proposition 1 will be shortened by making use of the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: Assume that indifferent informed voters engage in the counter-strategy. Suppose that the pressure group makes an offer to one candidate (candidate 1) and not to the other candidate (candidate 2) and that the offer is accepted. Suppose further that candidate 2 knows that the offer will be accepted. If the candidates maximize their probability of winning (in this case, vote share), then, under the above assumptions:
, then x 2 = x 1 -1; if x 1 = x* < ˆ x m I , then x 2 = x 1 + 1; and if x 1 = x* = ˆ x m I , then x 2 = x 1 = ˆ x m I .
PROOF:
Because the uninformed voters do not observe the candidates' choices, candidate 2's actual (as opposed to inferred) choice has no effect on the uninformed voters. Therefore, candidate 2 will only pay attention to the informed voters. If candidate 2 were to move away from the position that maximizes the number of informed voters voting for candidate 2 to another position (for example, ˆ x m U ), the uninformed would not respond any differently (after all, they are the uninformed voters) but the candidate would lose votes from the informed. If x 2 = x 1 = x* instead of x 2 = x 1 -1 = x* -1, then candidate 2 would not capture any additional votes from the informed voters, but it might lose some. This is because all of the informed voters weakly to the right of x* will vote for the endorsed candidate when they are otherwise indifferent. Hence, a move right will not capture any informed voters to the right. On the other hand, those voters to the left of x 2 = x 1 = x* (who would vote for candidate 2 if x 2 = x 1 -1 = x* -1) will either vote for the endorsed candidate (candidate 1) if they prefer x* over ˆ x m I or abstain if they are indifferent between ˆ x m I and x*. When x* > ˆ x m I + 1, there will always be at least one informed voter who satisfies such a condition (we have assumed that there is at least one informed voter at each position). When x* = ˆ x m I + 1, candidate 2 will receive the same number of voters at x 2 = x 1 -1 = x* -1 as the candidate does at x 2 = x 1 = x*. So to keep track of things, we will just assume that candidate 2 chooses x* -1 in this case, as well.
It is obvious that candidate 2 would get fewer votes if x 2 > x 1 .
A similar analysis holds for x 1 = x* < ˆ x m I , where 2's optimal strategy is to choose x 2 = x 1 + 1.
If x 1 = x* = ˆ x m I , then candidate 2's optimal strategy is to choose x 2 = x 1 = ˆ x m I .
Q.E.D.
We are now ready to show that pressure group donations move the outcome closer to the median voter.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that uninformed voters employ the strategic rule of thumb, informed voters employ the counter strategy, all the participants know this to be the case, and candidates maximize their probability of winning. If ˆ x p ≥ ˆ x m I , then under the above conditions: 10
, then x* = ˆ x p . Candidate 1 will accept the offer and win the election.
(
. Candidate 1 will accept the offer and win the election.
(iii) If ˆ x m I = ˆ x p , then the outcome will be at the pressure group's most preferred position even without an endorsement.
, then any offer that the pressure group would like to make would be rejected by the candidate(s).
(v) The strategic rule of thumb is a best strategy for every uninformed voter.
(vi) The pressure group will make an offer to at most one candidate (candidate 1).
In a nutshell, pressure group offers will only be accepted if the outcome is closer to the median voter, overall.
10 Since the uninformed know the relative positions of ˆ x p and ˆ x m I , we assume for convenience thatˆ x p is to the right of the median informed voter. We will next establish that candidate 1 will always win when she accepts the pressure group offer of x* = ˆ x p . All the uninformed voters strictly to the right of
plus all of the informed voters weakly to the right of ˆ x p will vote for candidate 1. This is more than half of all voters who actually vote. So candidate 1 will win if the uninformed voters act according to this rule. Candidate 1 is obviously happy with this state of affairs.
If she rejected the offer, she could no longer guarantee that she would win. Accepting the offer is a dominant strategy for candidate 1; setting x 2 = x 1 -1 = x* -1 = ˆ x p -1 is best for
Hence, we have a Nash equilibrium.
We next determine whether this strategic rule of thumb is best for the uninformed voters. All of the uninformed voters strictly to the right of The pressure group has obtained its most preferred position. Clearly, it would not want to choose another position. So if the cost of the campaign contribution is less than the benefit of improved outcome (as we have assumed), the pressure group will enter into an agreement with the candidate. Clearly, there is no advantage to contributing to both candidates' campaigns. Since the cost is greater, we will not observe this to be the case.
Suppose, contrary to the above argument, that the pressure group had chosen x* < x m I . Further suppose that candidate 1 accepted the offer. Then by Lemma 1, candidate 2
would choose x* + 1 ≤ ˆ x m I . Under these circumstances, the uninformed voters, using their strategic rule of thumb, would vote incorrectly; in particular, the uninformed to the right of the median would vote for the endorsed candidate when they should vote for the other candidate. But these circumstances would not arise; so when (i) holds the uninformed can use their strategic rule of thumb without fear that it could lead them astray.
First consider the case where the pressure group has made the following offer to candidate 1: x* = € ˆ x m I+U . Using the exact same logic as was used in (i) we can demonstrate both that candidate 1 will win with certainty if she accepts the offer and that the strategic rule of thumb is a best strategy for the uninformed voters. Once again, the pressure group will make an offer to only one candidate.
However, the pressure group would like to be closer to its most preferred position. (iii) If ˆ x m I = ˆ x p , then the outcome will be at the pressure group's most preferred position even without an endorsement. For convenience, we have assumed that the pressure group would not undertake the cost of an endorsement in this case. But even if it did, the outcome would be the same.
(iv) The final possibility is that In all of these cases, it never makes sense for pressure group to endorse more than one candidate. Hence, we have proven point (v).
Q.E.D. versa. For example, the National Rifle Association truthfully states that candidate 2 is more in favor of gun control (a bad from the viewpoint of the NRA) than candidate 1.
Uninformed voters can also make the proper inferences when there are two pressure groups with opposing interests even when advertising has no content and the uninformed voters do not know ˆ x m I . Hence the strategic rule of thumb works under these alternative scenarios, as well.
REMARK 2:
In equilibrium, the candidates will tell the truth. If there is an endorsement, the endorsed candidate will win when she tells the truth. So there is no advantage to lying. If there is no endorsement, the uninformed can infer some of the truth (that the candidates are both located at the median voter, whose exact position may not be known by the uninformed voter). So again there is no advantage to lying.
REMARK 3: If uninformed voters paid no attention to political advertising (say by
abstaining regardless of preference) and pressure groups knew this to be the case, then the equilibrium outcome would be no political advertising. This equilibrium is unlikely on empirical and theoretical grounds. We do observe political advertising, suggesting that "paying no attention" is not the strategy undertaken by the uninformed voters.
Furthermore, this kind of abstention would not be sequentially rational -if there were an endorsement, then it would make no sense for the uninformed voters to ignore it. The strategic rule of thumb is better for both the pressure group and the median voter. 12 voter is strictly to the right of the median voter, etc.) and the pressure group and candidate knew this to be the case, then the pressure group and candidate might be able to engage in a contrary advertising campaign, as well. The outcome would be the same even though there would be lying.
candidates in the absence of political advertising, then advertising can have no effect on the outcome of the election -the voters already have the requisite information.
Consequently, there is no need for pressure group donations that fund such advertising.
( There are other possible variations of the model. For example, we have not considered the case where the pressure group gains access to the winning candidate (although the assumed lexicographic preferences of the pressure group may be interpreted this way). Also we have not considered the case where there is more than one pressure group. These variations are likely to strengthen the results. What we have here is a worst-case scenario -one pressure group that does not value access. Nevertheless, the outcome is that the pressure group donations move the outcome from the median of the informed to the median over all voters. Having more than one pressure group eliminates the monopoly power of the pressure group and introduces competition. Gaining access increases the power of the vote-maximizing candidates vis a vis the pressure group. Such changes are unlikely to make things worse for the median voter. Indeed it is relatively easy to show that if there are two pressure groups, each on the opposite side of the median voter, then both candidates would always be at the median voter, overall.
However, this result is not surprising, and the assumption of two opposing but equally powerful pressure groups may be less realistic than the assumption of one pressure group (e.g., consumer pressure groups, if they exist, may be no match for producer pressure groups).
Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1998) also consider a situation where the uninformed have different preferences from the informed voters, but their model is quite different from that considered here. In their article, the uninformed are uninformed about something that is of value to all voters. For example, all voters prefer that a proposed bridge expansion be inexpensive to build, but perhaps only those who are heavy users of the bridge know whether this is likely to be the case. In this paper, the voters are unsure as to which candidate wants to build the bridge. Most important, in their work, there are no maximizing candidates and pressure groups that create the choice set for the voters, as is the case here. This narrowed choice set means that the strategic rule of thumb will not mislead the uninformed voters. An endorsement thus allows the uninformed to make the appropriate inferences so that the "uninformed" are no longer uninformed. Despite these differences between the Fedderson and Pesendorfer article and this paper, there is an underlying similarity. The strategic rule of thumb makes the median informed player the pivot; so by voting, the uninformed are implicitly leaving the decision to the more informed, a result in tune with their paper.
We next turn our attention to the case where candidates have policy positions.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that the uninformed voters employ the strategic rule of thumb, informed voters employ the counter strategy, and all the participants know this to be the case. If candidates maximize expected policy outcome, then campaign advertising financed by the pressure group will shift the outcome toward the median voter. The strategic rule of thumb is best for each uninformed voter.
The proof is found in the appendix. The logic is reminiscent of the proof for 
C. DISCUSSION
In this paper, as is the case for special-interest voting models in general, the problem of credible commitments has been assumed away. Of course, candidates can renege on their promises to special interests or voters. 13 If candidates renege on their promises to special interests, special interests will not contribute to campaigns. If candidates renege on their promises to voters, voters will ignore promises.
I have presented a model where the pressure group provides valuable information. Under such circumstances, it is possible that the pressure group provides too much valuable information! The right-wing pressure group asks itself whether the benefit to its members from a move to the right by the candidate compensates for the cost of the campaign contributions. The pressure group does not consider the cost to others of this move right. So including the cost of advertising, the move right may not be welfare improving. In our analysis, the move right improves the welfare of a majority of voters (which the pressure group does not consider in its own benefit calculations either); so, even if the cost of advertising is included, it is still likely to be welfare improving since more people benefit than lose from the move. While pressure groups have been accused of many things, providing too much valuable information is not one of them. In the rest of the paper, I have ignored the opportunity cost of advertising and instead have concentrated on the median voter result.
The discussion has been in terms of candidates, but the word "political party" can be exchanged for the word "candidate" without doing damage to the model. The model therefore can also be used to analyze the politics of Great Britain where the political party has more control than in the United States.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have assumed that uniformed voters use a simple rule of the thumb. Because in equilibrium this rule of thumb works in favor of each voter who employs it, no uninformed voter will want to defect from using this rule of thumb. Indeed, we have shown that even if the uniformed voter were to become fully informed, the uninformed voter could not improve the electoral outcome from his point of view. Thus we would expect this rule of thumb to survive. Given the information structure described in the paper, other rules of thumb do not do very well and thus are unlikely to be implemented. If uninformed voters abstain (or flip a coin), then the (expected) outcome will be at the median of the informed rather than the median of all voters; if the uninformed always vote for (against) the endorsed candidate, then the outcome will be worse than if the uninformed abstained when the endorser is closer to (further away from) the informed voter median than the uninformed voter median. Of course, there may be other information structures where the set of facts known and the set of facts not known by the uniformed voters differ from the sets characterized here. For each, information structure, a different rule of thumb may be appropriate. This paper thus opens up a whole new research enterprise.
We have modeled the behavior of uninformed voters when campaigns are financed by special interests in the context of a spatial model where both candidates' positions are endogenous. In particular, we have shown how uninformed but rational voters can make intelligent inferences and act strategically with simple rules of thumb. The work here thus extends the basic Downsian model to the case where there are pressure groups and uninformed voters.
Contrary to the view of many, the models presented here suggest that even uninformed voters can respond rationally to political advertising and that campaign donations and endorsements by special interests tend to move the outcome toward, instead of away from, the median voter.
The following question naturally arises. If, as argued in this paper, campaign contributions by pressure groups aid the democratic process, then why do we see so many attempts like the McCain-Feingold bill to put limits on campaign financing? The answer lies in this paper, also. As we have seen, pressure group contributions to political campaigns hurt some of the participants -informed voters on average and those informed voters whose preferences run contrary to the median uninformed voter in particular, as well as those policy-preferring candidates whose preferences are more aligned with the median informed voter than with the median uninformed voter. It is not surprising that these actors and their supporters would be against unlimited campaign financing.
Pressure groups have often been viewed as the bad guys of democracy. But "special interests" is just a pair of words meaning self interest, and from Adam Smith onward, we know that "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher or the brewer ... that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Here I have argued that the invisible hand works for pressure groups also. Instead of viewing pressure groups as undermining the democratic process, it may be more enlightening to view them as institutions that reduce transaction costs. 14 Just as speculators (who were once thought of as the bad guys of financial markets) are now seen as transaction-cost reducers, pressure groups need to be seen in a similar light. Once we have altered our perspective, we are primed for a new research agenda. For example, why efficiency would lead special interests to be organized in the way that they are and how or why they are different from political parties.
Perhaps even more important than the change in perspective on pressure groups is the added understanding on how uniformed voters can rationally respond to political advertising. This paper has shown how uninformed voters can make intelligent inferences based on their knowledge of the relevant actors' motivations and how the uninformed can make use of optimal rules of thumb that cannot be manipulated by candidates or pressure groups. Future work will no doubt consider still different information sets available to the uninformed and how the strategy of the uninformed voters changes in response to the changes in the information available.
APPENDIX 1 (can be dropped in published version)
In this appendix, we consider the mixed-strategy equilibrium that arises when a majority of voters prefer x* over ˆ 
Accept x* 0% 50% 100% 100% 50%
We will now consider the game matrix in greater detail.
When both candidates choose the same position, they each have a 50% chance of winning. Thus we have explained the diagonal values. Henceforth we will consider the case where the candidates have chosen different positions.
Suppose that there are no endorsements, then the uninformed cannot distinguish between the candidates and the candidate closest to the median informed voter will win.
When there are no endorsements, the uninformed either do not vote or vote for each candidate with probability1/2 (if the latter is the case, then the relevant entries should be 100 -ε instead of 100 or 0 + ε instead of 0 with ε approaching 0 as the number of uninformed voters increases toward infinity). The outcome of the election therefore depends on the informed voters. The unendorsed candidate who is closest to ˆ x m I will win the election. Hence all of the off-diagonal elements above the diagonal and to the left of the accept column are 0% because candidate 1 is further away from the median informed voter. For similar reasons, all of the off-diagonal elements below the diagonal and above the accept row are 100%.
If candidate 1 accepts the endorsement and chooses x* and candidate 2 chooseŝ There are no pure-strategy equilibria. It is easy to see that the only symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is for each candidate to choose Q.E.D.
Admittedly, the concept of endorsing both candidates does not make much sense, but we want to deal with the possibility that the pressure group implicitly threatens each candidate that if the candidate does not accept its conditions, the other candidate will be in an advantageous position. Perhaps a good substitute for "endorsing" is "providing campaign funds for advertising."
